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The drafters of the new Strategic Concept for NATO must realize that the transatlantic context in which the Alliance operates has changed fundamentally. 
Accordingly, in addition to improving NATO-EU relations 
and streamlining the NATO apparatus, basic changes in 
the organization of transatlantic relations overall are 
required, taking into account two major developments.
Key	Developments	in	
transatlantic	Relations
Imperative of a Comprehensive Approach. First, for 
some time now, the most important challenges to the 
United States and Europe, where they share interests in 
common, no longer fit into neat packets of “military” and 
“non-military,” but rather relate to the two together. This 
means among other things that civilian capabilities which 
the European Union can command – along with individual 
European countries – are becoming more important, if not 
in absolute terms at least relative to the traditional roles of 
NATO. While NATO clearly remains the United States’ 
preferred locus for strategic discussion and debate across 
the Atlantic, increasingly it is proving insufficient for 
considering the full range of North American and 
European political and even security debate and coopera-
tion. While the EU is still in the process of developing its 
capacities in the areas of foreign policy and defense – with 
the significant changes mandated in the Lisbon Treaty – 
on many issues direct dialogue between “EU-Brussels” 
and Washington takes place. This is particularly so as the 
definition of “security” has broadened. Many of the priority 
issues on today’s agenda are only indirectly related to 
defense and classic security issues. Not only does NATO 
have little or no expertise on the financial crisis, climate 
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change, energy and other key issues, but it would also 
send a strange signal if we would task a predominantly 
military alliance to address them. Furthermore, even with 
regard to security and defense issues, a comprehensive or 
holistic approach is required that also integrates the 
political, economic and social dimensions of foreign policy, 
and thus requires cooperation with other organizations. 
Evolution of Two Pillars. Second, because of this 
development, the overall Atlantic Alliance is evolving into 
“two-pillars,” but very different from the way that this 
concept was first bruited during the 1960s: the EU (along 
with individual European governments) now plays a 
growing role in overall transatlantic relations, including 
security relations writ large, along with NATO. And the EU, 
unlike NATO, is much more than a mere intergovernmental 
organization; rather it is a state-like actor which in 
numerous policy areas has supranational authority. The 
emergence of the EU as an actor in its own right, building 
up capabilities in both defense and in the field of diplo-
macy, is a new structural factor in the transatlantic relation-
ship. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty greatly 
strengthens the EU’s potential in these areas. 
Institutional Underperformance. This “pillarization” need 
not be problematic, if it were not for the fact that the 
European pillar is still very much internally divided. There 
are two levels of concern. One is the classic differentiation 
between those European NATO allies that “pull their full 
weight” and those that clearly do not – and this is not just 
in terms of relative size but of defense burden shouldered 
as a percentage of GDP. The other is that while some EU 
member states welcome its evolution and are prepared to 
see the EU as an actor, even beyond Europe, in all 
dimensions of foreign relations, others resist it. The end 
result is that the EU does not yet live up to its potential and 
NATO lacks all the capabilities that are needed. Both 
institutions thus underperform. 
A	Fundamental	Reconfiguration	
A fundamental reconfiguration reflecting the evolution of 
the transatlantic relationship should actually support the 
trend towards a stronger EU, as well as the breaking down 
of barriers to cooperation between it and NATO. By 
stimulating Europe to live up to its full potential, it will 
ensure that ultimately the transatlantic community as a 
whole will emerge stronger than before. Flexibility rather 
than institutional dogmatism will keep the overall Atlantic 
relationship viable. 
Restructuring the transatlantic relationship along these 
lines has six main implications: 
(1) Both NATO allies and EU member states need finally to 
understand that the two institutions must work 
together if either is to succeed in providing security 
for nations on the two sides of the Atlantic. Change is 
facilitated, politically, by France’s rejoining the NATO 
integrated military command structure and by the 
practical end of U.S. resistance to a strong European 
defense personality outside of NATO (i.e., within the 
EU). But it is inhibited by bureaucratic inertia, by 
Turkey’s objection to EU-NATO cooperation (including 
in Afghanistan, where the consequences are severe for 
all), by limitations on cooperation among defense 
industries on the two sides of the Atlantic and 
continued resistance to defense rationalization in 
Europe, and by the continuing “two cultures” problem 
within European foreign and defense ministries (which 
should begin breaking down as a result of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the new European External Action Service). 
Leadership in both institutions is needed to foster 
practical as well as political cooperation – e.g., with 
NATO’s Allied Command Transformation also serving 
the European Union.
“I do not consider the development of 
European Security and Defence Policy as 
competition with NATO, but complementary  
to NATO.” 
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,  
November 18, 2009
(2) In today’s world, the EU must have the necessary 
margin of maneuver to interact flexibly with all 
global actors. Of course, the United States will remain 
the closest to Europe. In league with the U.S. engage-
ment in NATO, the EU-U.S. partnership therefore must 
be deepened, made more comprehensive and 
become more operational, so that Europeans and 
Americans have a forum where they can jointly discuss 
global challenges in all dimensions of foreign affairs 
and key areas of domestic policy, beyond what is 
possible just at NATO. This political partnership must 
be much more than “summitry” – perhaps permanent 
bodies are in order.  In any case, Europeans must 
increasingly speak to the United States as the EU, in 
addition to those bilateral relationships that will no 
doubt continue, certainly for the larger European 
powers. Within such a political partnership, NATO will 
continue to be important (and, for the United States, it 
will continue to be most important, at least for the years 
immediately ahead; and the United States will continue 
to resist the idea that an EU “caucus” should come to 
the North Atlantic Council with a single, agreed 
position). But because the European Security Strategy 
and the U.S. National Security Strategy cover a 
broader remit (at the level of “grand strategy”), where 
they coincide should play a major role in shaping 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept, along with the input of 
individual European countries. It would be logical 
therefore to have a contribution to the current debate 
about the NATO Strategic Concept from the EU as 
such, next to those from the individual allies; indeed, 
the EU should be continuing its own strategic review 
and translate its European Security Strategy into more 
concrete objectives, to be ready for discussion and 
decision in parallel with NATO’s November summit in 
Lisbon. There would also be value in a U.S.-Canada-
EU summit the following day. 
(3) The primary levels of decision-making within the 
Atlantic relationship, including on security and 
defense, should be three-fold:  NATO, the EU, and 
the U.S.-EU. Over time, the chances are growing that 
in non-Article 5 situations, it will be in the EU where 
Europeans take the primary political decisions on 
whether to act in a given crisis, as they did recently 
with regard to Lebanon and Georgia. If military action 
is called for and a U.S. role is required, NATO will have 
primary responsibility; if not, then the operational 
framework can be the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) or the United Nations. That 
choice will always be a tailored decision, a function of 
which partners want to go along and which organiza-
tion is best suited for the crisis at hand – reality is too 
complex for a fixed division of labor to work. 
(4) Europeans have a capability problem, caused by 
the fragmentation of their defense efforts, which 
only Europeans can solve, through increased 
cooperation and pooling, both within NATO and within 
the EU. At the EU level, in the context of CSDP, the 
further development of European military capabilities 
can notably be done via the “Permanent Structured 
Cooperation” provided by the Lisbon Treaty. This 
permits the autonomy of CSDP, while even pooled 
multinational capabilities can be deployed for NATO 
(or UN) operations if that framework is decided upon 
for a specific mission. 
(5) Precisely because in some crises not all opera-
tional frameworks (CSDP, NATO, UN) will be 
available or advisable, each must be a fully-
fledged alternative, relevant to the level and char-
acter of military action required, so as to guarantee at 
least one option to deploy forces rapidly, safely and 
successfully in every crisis. In addition to existing 
NATO capacities, that requires permanent EU 
command and control structures, including an inte-
grated civil-military standing Operational Headquarters 
for CSDP. At the functional level, CSDP already has 
guaranteed access to some NATO assets, including 
planning capabilities, under the “Berlin-plus” agree-
ments. This access can be extended, while in order to 
strengthen CSDP’s capabilities, some NATO staff 
officers from EU countries could be shifted to a civil-
military EU Operational Headquarters without ill effect.
“More Europe is not a strategy directed  
against anyone. No one has any reason to  
fear Europe, but everyone should be able to 
depend on Europe.”
Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany,  
Guido Westerwelle, February 6, 2010
(6) With regard to the EU’s civilian assets, an EU-NATO 
cooperation agreement needs to be concluded, 
providing for full EU involvement from the start in 
planning for scenarios in which NATO would lead a 
military operation and the EU would lead a concurrent 
civilian deployment. A similar arrangement can be 





The United States rightly has great expectations vis-à-vis 
the EU, especially now that the Lisbon Treaty has finally 
entered into force. Washington should not hesitate to 
encourage the more Atlantic-oriented EU members to 
make the fullest possible use of the new Treaty provisions, 
and to take a stronger EU role into account when revising 
the NATO Strategic Concept. Indeed, to find a dynamic 
relevant to foreign policy and security challenges facing 
the transatlantic nations, fundamental debates need to 
take place and be resolved, including the issues of 
European unity and autonomy, incentives for European 
countries to take security issues seriously, including 
beyond Europe, and for making possible a level of 
cooperation between the EU and NATO that has eluded 
both institutions for so long. Included in these efforts is the 
need to stimulate a stronger and more united Europe, 
which will undoubtedly demand a greater say in decision-
making, but with which true burden-sharing will be 
possible. For the United States, sharing influence and 
decision-making is a wise choice, given its own require-
ments for effective partners in meeting so many of today’s 
and tomorrow’s security and security-related challenges.
“We also support the further strengthening  
of European defense, an increased role for  
the European Union in preserving peace  
and security, and a fundamentally stronger  
NATO-EU partnership...”
Vice President Joseph R. Biden, February 9, 2010
So the ball is now in both the U.S. and European camps – 
but is either ready to catch it? A de facto evolution towards 
a “two-pillar” transatlantic security relationship – in the 
broadest sense – is beginning to take shape, but for the 
model to work effectively and a true partnership to 
emerge, both between the EU and NATO and between the 
United States and the EU for the broader range of issues, 
the United States, its NATO partners, and the EU must all 
act decisively. This must be done at the highest political 
levels on the two sides of the Atlantic, recreating an overall 
sense of common strategic purpose, even when there can 
be differences of view about the precise security chal-
lenges facing different countries and the precise means 
needed to counter them. NATO and the EU should thus no 
longer be seen as competitors, but instead as two 
institutions serving essentially the same ends, and they 
need to be restructured with this vision in mind. 
February 2010
The Atlantic Council of the United States has as its mission the renewal of the Atlantic community for 21st century global 
challenges through constructive U.S.-European leadership and engagement in world affairs. Led by Senator Chuck Hagel, 
Chairman, and Frederick Kempe, President and CEO, the Atlantic Council embodies a network of policy, academic and 
business leaders who foster transatlantic ties through non-partisan and cross-national discussions and studies.
1101 15th Street NW • 11th Floor • Washington, DC 20005 • (202) 778-4957 • www.acus.org
StRAtcon	2010
The Strategic Advisors Group’s STRATCON 2010 
project seeks to shape and inform the transatlantic 
debate over NATO’s new Strategic Concept. 
STRATCON 2010 will issue publications to define  
the critical issues NATO must confront in drafting a  
new Strategic Concept. For more information about 
the SAG or STRATCON 2010, please contact Vice 
President and Director of the Program on Interna-
tional Security Damon Wilson at dwilson@acus.org 
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